I take it as agreed that all educators need a philosophy and that educational practice in the schools is always based on some philosophical theory even though the connection between theory and practice is imperfectly understood by or unknown to the teacher. Such a theoretical basis Dewey supplies. Indeed he regards the supplying of such a basis as the very essence of philosophy itself. Further, no other modern philosopher in the English-speaking world supplies such a basis except, perhaps, Whitehead; but Whitehead's philosophy is so difficult that it is likely to be some time before he is sufficiently understood to affect the schools. Perhaps he never will. It used to be said at Columbia University "Great is Dewey and Kilpatrick is his prophet." But Whitehead's educational prophet has not yet arrived; and he is needed far more than Kilpatrick ever was. For Dewey himself in the most· careful and thorough manner worked out the implications for education of his philosophical point of view, anticipating many possible objections; he thus forced any discussion of modern educational theory in the English-speaking world to begin with him. It has often justifiably been suggested that his style is obscure. But it must be said that Dewey is sometimes obscure for the same reason that Kant and Plato are sometimes obscure, because they are dealing with problems and conceptions which are in themselves exceedingly difficult to understand and to express in language. Upon occasion Dewey writes very well. I think that any unbiassed reader of his book Reconstruction in Philosophy will find it on the whole both lucid and convincing. As Albert Lynd says, contrasting him with some of his followers, Dewey was "one of the most unconfused persons in America." Granted his fundamental premises, his philosophy hangs together amazingly well. It is in his followers (or some of them) that confusion of thought and a ridiculous turgidity of style are found, not in himself.
Like many philosophers, Dewey was sometimes misunderstood by his followers. (Incidentally, unlike many, he lived long enough to protest against some of these misunderstandings.) Three of those misunderstandings may, in justice to Dewey, be briefly mentioned here.
( 1) Dewey, who was himself a prodigious worker all his life, never maintained that school should be all play, but that self-discipline should be substituted for drudgery imposed by a taskmaster. The catch phrase "Learning is Fun," used by some who profess to be his followers, is enough to make him turn in his grave. Learning is not fun. It is a serious (though not therefore a distasteful) business, and none knew it better than Dewey himself. (2) Despite the anti-intellectual bias of some "progressives," Dewey's philosophy is not anti-intellectual. On the contrary it is over-intellectual. Nothing can be clearer than that. His writings are studded with phrases declaring that the only hope of mankind is the proper use of intelligence or understanding. This is a constant theme in at least three of his books, Democracy and Education, The Quest for Certainty, and Reconstruction in Philosophy. A single quotation is, I think, enough to illustrate this aspect of his teaching: "Intelligent action is the sole ultimate resource of mankind in every field whatsoever" (The Quest for Certainty). (3) Dewey never said that the study of the past should be discontinued. On the contrary he repeatedly emphasizes the relevance of the past to the present and generously acknowledges his own debt as a philosopher to Plato and Hegel. What he did say was that study of the past should be connected to the present. The past, he said, "adds a new dimension to life, but on condition that it be seen as the past of the present, and not as another and disconnected world."
Has the whole "progressive" movement, then, gone astray from Dewey's principles? Are its merits drawn from elsewhere? Are its excesses the result of misunderstanding or misrepresentation of Dewey? Only partly. I believe that the undeniable merits of some "progressive" practices derive directly from Dewey and also that some of the most serious "progressive" shortcomings are the direct result of fundamental flaws and gaps in Dewey's philosophy. Like Dr. Hilda Neatby and other opponents of the "progressives," I consider that the shortcomings outbalance the merits. But one must grant honour where honour is due. In particular one must admire Dewey's insistence everywhere and at all times on the relevance of learning. There is no true teacher yet born who is unaware of the danger of "getting in a rut," of doing something this year merely because it was done last year, of teaching something merely because one happens to know it, of doling out lessons mechanically day by day instead of making them live. To all teachers so tempted Dewey's philosophy is a perpetual warning, and Dewey intended it to be so. We must also be grateful for his emphasis upon the unity of studies, upon their integration with life, and upon the interrelation of theory and practice. This writer would like to record his personal gratitude for having first learnt from Dewey to keep asking himself in regard to educational theories, "How will it work out in practice?" We are in his debt also for the importance which he attaches to the educational process and for the systematic and thorough way in which he considers all aspects of the educational problem.
Nonetheless if we are wide awake when we read his books certain omissions and difficulties soon appear. They may be briefly summed up.
1. There is a remarkable absence of references to modern psychology, many of the discoveries and theories of which are highly relevant to educational practice. In particular no consideration is given to the Gestalt psychology nor to the work done in the United States and elsewhere on individual differences. Indeed it would seem that Dewey does not even recognize the existence of individual differences. For example, in Democracy and Education there is the categorical statement, "How one person's abilities compare in quantity with those of another is none of the teacher's business." This is an extraordinary statement to come from one who has been hailed as the first of modem educational philosophers. It is of course unfair to expect Dewey to know anything of the recent work in the factorial analysis of human ability. But Terman and Kohler began their work during the First World War and their results were published during or soon after the war. The truth appears to be that Dewey's psychological views were firmly fixed before 1900 and that he had little acquaintance with the development of psychology after the time of William James.
2. A second well-known difficulty arises from Dewey's statement that the moral status of an action must be judged by its consequences. It is for this view that he is taken severely to task by Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy. How are the consequences to be judged? By their consequences? This is not merely a verbal quibble, but involves a greater difficulty. The answer seems to be that consequences are good if they lead to "growth." What then is "growth"? Growth leads to richer experiences. What does "richer" mean? Apparently it means simply "more" experiences. This does not seem a satisfactory basis for morals.
3. Like Alexander Meiklejohn, I find Dewey's interpretation of demQcracy "misleading and incomplete." For example, he does not deal with the educational implications of the representative nature of modem democratic government. Nor does he show any recognition of the different views of democracy which are designated as Jeffersonianism and J acksonianism in the Harvard Report on General Education in a Free Society. Without discussion he appears to take it for granted that his view of democracy as "shared experience" is the only possible one. I suppose it is unfair to expect him to have considered the views of such modem writers on political theory as A. D . Lindsay, Harold Laski, or Carl Becker, but one might reasonably expect some mention of, say, Acton and Bryce. There is none.
In this respect, as in others, it is impossible not to feel that Dewey is simply out of date-a very serious fault according to his own theories, and one which his followers would do well to consider carefully. If they believe that what they follow must always be up to date, they must realize that Dewey's ideas are now rather old-fashioned. But to say that a philosophical viewpoint is wrong simply because it is old is both unfair and very dangerous. Machiavelli's Prince and Plato's Republic were written a long time ago and in circumstances vasdy different from those of the modem world; yet much of their content is most apposite to the present time because they deal with fundamental political problems in a serious and thorough manner. I do not think that this can be said of Dewey's discussion of democracy. If you believe that doctrines necessarily become obsolete with changing times, then you must admit that Dewey's are now at least obsolescent. If you believe that doctrines are to be discarded only because they are incomplete or confused, you will at least have to examine Dewey's theory of democracy very carefully. I think you will find it unsatisfying.
4. As J. Oliver Buswell points out very clearly in his book entided
The Philosophies of F. R . Tennant and John Dewey, Dewey rejects dualisms, yet constantly employs dualistic nomenclature. A simple example is to be found in the early pages of Art as Experience, on the first page of which the author is at pains to establish that the work of art is not the product of the artist but "what the product does with and in experience." Yet on the very next page we find the statement, "By common consent, the Parthenon is a great work of art." It may be said in defence that to speak consistendy in the new way would involve the invention of a whole new vocabulary. But this is precisely Buswell's complaint. In similar circumstances Kant invented a new vocabulary. So, apparently, has Whitehead. Dewey has not.
5. As Buswell also points out, Dewey at times becomes (or tends to become) a propagandist rather than a philosopher; that is, he seems more intent upon having his own doctrines accepted than upon finding the truth. He sets up men of straw in order to knock them down. He condemns doctrines on the ground of their historical origin. He presses upon the reader by sheer weight of verbiage. He piles one sweeping statement upon another until the reader wilts and gives in. By sheer persistence he wears you down. Yet if you read him carefully sentence by sentence you will often find room for doubt or disagreement. A few sentences from Democracy and Education will illustrate what I mean. The comments in brackets are intended to suggest the thoughts that might occur to a careful reader. Here is the quotation (from p. 143 of the 1936 edition ) :
"The aim of efficiency, like any educational aim, must be included within the process of experience. [What does this mean? Can an "aim" be included in a "process"?] When it is measurable by tangible external products, and not by the achieving of a distinctively valuable experience, it becomes materialistic. [What is the "it" referred to here, "aim" or "efficiency"? Does the first "it" refer to "efficiency" and the second to "aim"?] Results in the way of commodities which may be the outgrowth of an efficient personality are, in the strictest sense, by-products of education. [But is this true? What does it mean?]" I do not pretend that this passage was chosen at random. But I affirm that it is not unfairly taken from its context and that it is typical of much of Dewey's writing. On the whole it is surprising how little positive teaching there is in Dewey. Should anyone doubt this I suggest that he read Democracy and Education carefully and then ask himself two questions: (a ) What proportion of the book is merely critical and destructive, and (b) What are the positive doctrines stated? He will, I think, have some difficulty with (b) .
Having said that, let me state very briefly what appear to me to be the most important of Dewey's doctrines, (1) change (not entities) is the great reality; (2) all dualisms are false; and (3) man's salvation lies in the scientific method. These three propositions are extraordinarily interesting and a great deal could be said about each of them. However, I shall here restrict myself to following through the consequences for education of Dewey's rejection of a single dualism, but that the most important, that dualism which William James described as "mind knowing and thing known." In this statement James appears as a thorough-going dualist. But it is well known that elsewhere he developed the idea that the relations between existences are every bit as real as the existences themselves. Out of this came his doctrine of "the passing thought the thinker." This is the doctrine that Dewey embraces. I do not think, however, that you will find in Dewey any categorical rejection of the subject-object dualism, though it is implicit in much of what he says, and, in my' opinion, is basic to his whole philosophy. However that may be, we do find this dualism explicitly rejected in Kilpatrick. Nothing could be clearer than Kilpatrick's rejection as expressed on pages 182-4 of his Philosophy of Education. If the master does not explicitly make the rejection his prophet does. And since the prophet has probably had more influence upon educators than the master, we may assume the effects of its rejection as important. Whether educators understand its nature and origin or not, it seems to me evident that disregard of the subject-object dualism has in fact been widespread among the "progressives" and is the root cause of their mistakes.
For what are the consequences of this attitude? Let me list some of them briefly: (1) If the subject-object dualism is rejected, what is left? Experience. Hence Dewey's (and the progressives') excessive emphasis upon experience. (2) If there is no separable subject, no attributes can be attached to it. Thus, for example, there can be no native differences in intelligence. (3) If the "object" has no separable existence, no attributes can be attached to it. There is therefore no means for evaluating subject-matter. All experiences are "experience" and all are equally valuable. (4) If "experience" alone exists, then scientific method is equally applicable to all situations. One result of this is the burgeoning of all sorts of ridiculous so-called "research" projects, with all the apparatus of scientific planning and the mathematics of probability. Some of this valueless research is the result of stupid people attempting to use a method they do not understand, but from the standpoint of the dualist it is also clear that much of it is the result of attempting to apply a method to situations where it is inapplicable. (5) A further result of the rejection of the subject-object and other dualisms is the blurring of the outlines of thought. It is not unfair, I think, to paraphrase Dewey's treatment of such dualisms as "interest v. effort" or "means v. ends" as follows. "There is really no such thing as black, or white. There is only grey. Black is only an extremely dark grey, white a very light one," and there are all degrees in between. Henceforth we will talk only of grey." The result is that indubitable differences in shades of grey are neglected and thinking becomes woolly and confused. (Incidentally the subject-object dualism is not of similar type to the black-white, or the interest-effort dualism, though Dewey seems to think it is.) Ail these consequences of Dewey's position seem to me to be characteristic of those educators who call
themselves "progressives."
There is only one other aspect of Dewey's general viewpoint that I should like to touch on. This is his expectation that every man shall be his own philosopher, that is, that every man shall start with his own experience of life, and form unaided his own theories and personally test them. This is Dewey's over-intellectuality which we mentioned previously. It has had two results. First, a disastrous neglect of tradition. For every thinker, like every artist, must start both from experience and from a tradition. The shallowness of many of Dewey's followers is a direct result of this neglect. Second, it soon becomes evident that the majority of men have neither the time nor the ability nor the inclination to work out their philosophy from scratch. The result has been what has been called the anti-intellectuality, or better, the pseudo-intellectuality of the progressives. They are not content to teach their doctrine. They must make pretence that those who accept it have worked it out for themselves. Hence their surveys, their questionnaires, and their contrived discussion groups.
It is just possible that somebody, having read thus far, may say, "Well, isn't Dewey's philosophy ridiculous! How were we ever taken in by it? Let's throw it out at once." I am not one of those who think Dewey philosophically disreputable. For those who are not already aware of them, I must point out that there are very great difficulties in the dualist position. The point I wish to make is that a person cannot be both a dualist and a follower of Dewey. The two points of view are incompatible. Personally I am a dualist, mainly on empirical grounds, and I am convinced that any satisfactory educational philosophy must begin from the dualist position.
On the other hand I have no doubt that if any "progressive" reads this article he will straightway accuse me of being a traditionalist, of failing to live up to the times, of cleaving to an outworn creed, etc., etc. This prospect leaves me completely unmoved. The true-blue "progressive," who is as hidebound in his opinions as anyone, will in time himself become a traditionalist, if indeed he has not become one already. But as we have already said, it is no real condemnation of a doctrine merely to say it is not up-to-date. The reign of Dewey in educational philosophy is passing, not because his doctrines are out of date but because their weaknesses are being discovered. All educators should read Dewey himself, not his expositors. But they should also read other modern writers who have a positive philosophy to expound such as Sir Richard Livingstone, Dr. Hutchins, or Canon Bell. Canadian educators especially should read a book by a Canadian which is not nearly so well known as it should be, John Macdonald's Mind, School and Civilisation. Whether you agree with his opinions or not, it must, I think, be admitted that alone of modern Canadian writers on education Macdonald has gone down into the philosophical deeps, that he can find his way around there, and that he can express his conclusions with brevity and force. Too many of the rest of us have paddled around for too long in the intellectual shallows. It is time to take a plunge into deeper waters. What do they know of Dewey who only Dewey know?
